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Mechanics and Causes 
of Economic Growth 
I
nstead of summarizing the models and ideas presented so far, I end with a brief discussion of 
what we have learned from the models in this book and how they offer a useful perspective 
on world growth and cross-country income differences. I then provide a quick overview of 
some of the many remaining questions, which are important to emphasize both as a measure 
of our ignorance and as potential topics for future research. 
What Have We Learned? 
Let us ﬁrst summarize the most important aspects and takeaway lessons of our analysis. 
Growth as the source of current income differences. At an empirical level, the investigation 
of economic growth is important not only for understanding the growth process, but also 
because the analysis of the sources of cross-country income differences today requires us to 
understand why some countries have grown rapidly over the past 200 years while others have 
not (Chapter 1). 
The role of physical capital, human capital, and technology. Cross-country differences in 
economic performance and growth over time are related to physical capital, human capital, and 
technology. Part of our analysis has focused on the contributions of these factors to production 
and growth (Chapters 2 and 3). One conclusion that has emerged concerns the importance 
of technology in understanding both cross-country and over-time differences in economic 
performance. Here, technology refers to advances in techniques of production, advances in 
knowledge, and the general efﬁciency of the organization of production. 
Endogenous investment decisions. While we can make empirical progress by taking cross-
country differences in physical and human capital as given,  we also need to endogenize 
these investment decisions to develop a more satisfactory understanding of the mechanics 
and the causes of income and growth differences across countries. A large part of the book 
has focused on understanding physical and human capital accumulation (Chapters 8–11). 
Investments in physical and human capital are forward-looking and depend on the rewards 
that individuals expect from their investments. Understanding differences in these investments 
is therefore intimately linked to understanding how reward structures—that is, the pecuniary 
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and nonpecuniary rewards and incentives for different activities—differ across societies and 
how individuals respond to differences in reward structures. 
Endogenous technology.  I have also emphasized throughout that technology should be 
thought of as endogenous, not as manna from heaven. There are good empirical and theoretical 
reasons for thinking that new technologies are created by proﬁt-seeking individuals and ﬁrms 
through research, development, and tinkering. In addition, decisions to adopt new technologies 
are likely to be highly responsive to proﬁt incentives. Since technology appears to be a 
prime driver of economic growth over time and a major factor in cross-country differences in 
economic performance, we must understand how technology responds to factor endowments, 
market structures,  and rewards. Developing a conceptual framework that emphasizes the 
endogeneity of technology has been one of the major objectives of this book. The modeling 
of endogenous technology necessitates ideas and tools that are somewhat different from 
those involved in the modeling of physical and human capital investments. Three factors 
are particularly important. First, the ﬁxed costs of creating new technologies combined with 
the nonrival nature of technology necessitates the use of models in which innovators have 
ex post (after innovation) monopoly power. The same might apply, though perhaps to a lesser 
degree,  to ﬁrms that adopt new technologies. The presence of monopoly power changes 
the welfare properties of decentralized equilibria and creates a range of new interactions 
and externalities (Chapters 12 and 13 and Section 21.5 in Chapter 21). Second, the process 
of innovation is implicitly one of competition and creative destruction. The modeling of 
endogenous technology necessitates more detailed models of the industrial organization of 
innovation. These models shed light on the impact of market structure, competition, regulation, 
and IPR protection on innovation and technology adoption (Chapters 12 and 14). Third, 
endogenous technology implies that not only the aggregate rate of technological change but 
also the types of technologies that are developed will be responsive to rewards. Key factors 
inﬂuencing the types of technologies that societies develop are again reward structures and 
factor endowments. For example, changes in relative supplies of different factors are likely to 
affect which types of technologies will be developed and adopted (Chapter 15). 
Linkages across societies and balanced growth at the world level.  While endogenous 
technology and endogenous growth are major ingredients in our thinking about the process 
of economic growth in general and the history of world economic growth in particular, it is 
also important to recognize that most economies do not invent their own technologies but adopt 
them from the world technology frontier or adapt them from existing technologies (Chapter 18). 
In fact, the process of technology transfer across nations might be one of the reasons why, after 
the initial phase of industrialization, countries that have been part of the global economy have 
grown at broadly similar rates (Chapter 1). Therefore the modeling of cross-country income 
differences and the process of economic growth for a large part of the world requires a detailed 
analysis of technology diffusion and international economic linkages. Two topics deserve 
special attention in this context. The ﬁrst is the contracting institutions supporting contracts 
between upstream and downstream ﬁrms, between ﬁrms and workers, and between ﬁrms 
and ﬁnancial institutions. These institutional arrangements affect the amount of investment, 
the selection of entrepreneurs and ﬁrms, and the efﬁciency with which different tasks are 
allocated across ﬁrms and workers. There are marked differences in contracting institutions 
across societies, and these differences appear to be a major factor inﬂuencing technology 
adoption and diffusion in the world economy. Contracting institutions not only have a direct 
effect on technology and prosperity, but they also shape the internal organization of ﬁrms, 
which contributes to the efﬁciency of production and inﬂuences how innovative ﬁrms will be 
(Section 18.5 in Chapter 18). The second is international trading relationships. International 
trade not only generates static gains familiar to economists but also inﬂuences the innovation 
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how international trading relationships help the process of technology diffusion and enhance 
the specialization of production (Chapter 19). 
Takeoffs and failures. The past 200 years of world economic growth stand in stark contrast 
to the thousands of years before. Despite intermittent growth in some parts of the world during 
certain epochs, the world economy was largely stagnant until the end of the eighteenth century. 
This stagnation had multiple aspects. These included low productivity,  high volatility in 
aggregate and individual outcomes, a largely rural and agricultural economy, and a Malthusian 
conﬁguration in which increases in output were often accompanied by increases in population, 
thus having only a limited effect on per capita income. Another major aspect of stagnation has 
been the failed growth attempts: many societies grew for certain periods of time and then lapsed 
back into depressions and stagnation. This cycle changed at the end of the eighteenth century. 
We owe our prosperity today to the takeoff in economic activity, and especially in industrial 
activity, that started in Britain and Western Europe and spread to certain other parts of the 
world, most notably to Western European offshoots, such as the United States and Canada. 
The nations that are rich today are precisely those where this process of takeoff originated 
or those that were able to rapidly adopt and build on the technologies underlying this takeoff 
(Chapter 1). A study of current income differences across countries requires understanding why 
some countries failed to take advantage of the new technologies and production opportunities. 
Structural changes and transformations. Modern economic growth and development are 
accompanied by a set of sweeping structural changes and transformations. These include 
changes in the composition of production and consumption (the shift from agriculture to 
industry and from industry to services),  urbanization,  ﬁnancial development,  changes in 
inequality of income and inequality of opportunity, the transformation of social and living 
arrangements, changes in the internal organization of ﬁrms, and the demographic transition. 
While the process of economic development is multifaceted, much of its essence lies in the 
structural transformation of the economy and the society at large (Section 17.6 in Chapter 
17 and Chapters 20 and 21). Many of these transformations are interesting to study for 
their own sake. They are also important ingredients for sustained growth. Lack of structural 
transformation is not only a symptom of stagnation but is also often one of its causes. Societies 
may fail to take off and beneﬁt from the available technology and investment opportunities, 
partly because they have not managed to undergo the requisite structural transformations and 
thus lack the type of ﬁnancial relations, the appropriate skills, or the types of ﬁrms that are 
conducive to the adoption of new technologies. 
Policy, institutions, and political economy. The reward structures faced by ﬁrms and individ­
uals play a central role in shaping whether they undertake the investments in new technology 
and in human capital necessary for takeoff, industrialization, and economic growth. These 
reward structures are determined by policies and institutions. Policies and institutions also 
directly affect whether a society can embark on modern economic growth for a variety of 
interrelated reasons (Chapter 4). First, they directly determine the society’s reward structure, 
thus shaping whether investments in physical and human capital and technological innovations 
are proﬁtable. Second, they determine whether the infrastructure and contracting arrangements 
necessary for modern economic relations are present. For example, modern economic growth 
would be impossible in the absence of some degree of contract enforcement, the maintenance 
of law and order, and at least a minimum amount of investment in public infrastructure. Third, 
they inﬂuence and regulate the market structure, thus determining whether the forces of creative 
destruction are operational so that new and more efﬁcient ﬁrms can replace less efﬁcient incum­
bents. Finally, institutions and policies may sometimes (or perhaps often) block the adoption 
and use of new technologies to protect politically powerful incumbent producers or stabilize 
the established political regime. Thus to understand the process of modern economic growth, 
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investigate the political economy of growth, paying special attention to which individuals and 
groups will be the winners from economic growth and which the losers. When losers cannot be 
compensated and have sufﬁcient political power, we may expect the political economy equi­
librium to lead to policies and institutions that are not growth enhancing. The basic analysis of 
the political economy of growth generates insights about what types of distortionary policies 
may block growth; when these distortionary policies will be adopted; and how technology, 
market structure, and factor endowments interact with the incentives of the social groups in 
power to encourage or discourage economic growth (Chapter 22). 
Endogenous political institutions. Policies and institutions are central to understanding the 
growth process over time and cross-country differences in economic performance. These social 
choices are in turn determined in the context of a society’s political institutions. Democracies 
and dictatorships are likely to make different policy choices and create distinct types of reward 
structures. But political institutions themselves are not exogenous. They can change along the 
equilibrium path as a result of their own dynamics and of stimuli coming from changes in 
technology, trading opportunities, and factor endowments (Chapter 23). For a more complete 
understanding of world economic growth and the income differences today, we therefore need 
to study (1) how political institutions affect policies and economic institutions, thus shaping 
incentives for ﬁrms and workers; (2) how political institutions themselves change, especially 
when interacting with economic outcomes and technology; and (3) why political institutions 
and the associated economic institutions did not lead to sustained economic growth throughout 
history, why they enabled economic takeoff 200 years ago, and why in some countries they 
blocked the adoption and use of superior technologies and derailed the process of economic 
growth. 
In this summary, I have focused on the ideas most relevant for examining the process of world 
economic growth and cross-country income differences we observe today. The focus in the 
book has been not only on ideas but also on careful mathematical modeling of these ideas 
to develop coherent and rigorous theoretical approaches. I do not repeat here the theoretical 
foundations of these ideas, which range from basic consumer, producer, and general equilib­
rium theory to dynamic models of accumulation, models of monopolistic competition, models 
of world equilibria, and dynamic models of political economy. But I emphasize again that a 
thorough study of the theoretical foundations of these ideas is necessary both to develop a sat­
isfactory understanding of the main issues and to ﬁnd the best way of making them empirically 
operational. 
A Possible Perspective on Growth and Stagnation 
over the Past 200 Years 
The previous section summarized the most important ideas highlighted in this book. I now 
discuss how some of these ideas might be useful in shedding light on the process of world 
economic growth and cross-country divergence that have motivated our investigation from the 
start. The central questions are: 
1.  Why did the world economy not experience sustained growth before 1800? 
2.  Why did economic takeoff start around 1800 and in Western Europe? 
3.  Why did some societies manage to beneﬁt from the new technologies and organizational 
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I now offer a narrative that provides some tentative answers to these three questions. While 
certain parts of the mechanisms I propose here have been investigated econometrically and 
other parts are supported by historical evidence, the reader should view this narrative as a ﬁrst 
attempt at providing coherent answers to these central questions. Two aspects of these answers 
are noteworthy. First, they build on the theoretical insights that the models presented so far 
generate. Second, in the spirit of the discussion in Chapter 4, they link the proximate causes of 
economic phenomena to fundamental causes, and in particular to institutions. And here I take 
a shortcut. Although I emphasized in Chapter 23 that there are no perfect political institutions 
and that each set of different political arrangements is likely to favor some groups at the ex­
pense of others, I simplify the discussion in this part by making a core distinction between two 
sets of institutional arrangements, one less conducive to growth than the other one. The ﬁrst, 
which I refer to as authoritarian political systems, encompasses absolutist monarchies, dicta­
torships, autocracies, and various types of oligarchies that concentrate power in the hands of a 
small minority and pursue economic policies that are favorable to the interests of this minority. 
Authoritarian systems often rely on some amount of repression, because they seek to maintain 
an unequal distribution of political power and economic beneﬁts. They also adopt economic 
institutions and policies that protect incumbents and create rents for those who hold political 
power. The second set of institutions are participatory regimes.These regimes place constraints 
on rulers and politicians, thus preventing the absolutist tendencies in political systems, and give 
voice to new economic interests, so that a strict decoupling between political and economic 
power is avoided. Such regimes include constitutional monarchies (where broader sections 
of the society take part in economic and political decision making) and democracies (where 
political participation is greater than in nondemocratic regimes). The distinguishing feature 
of participatory regimes is that they provide voice and (economic and political) security to a 
broader cross section of society than do authoritarian regimes. As a result, they are more open 
to entry by new businesses and provide a more level playing ﬁeld and better security of prop­
erty rights to a relatively broad section of the society. Thus in some ways, the contrast between 
authoritarian political systems and participatory regimes is related to the contrast between the 
growth-promoting cluster of institutions and the growth-blocking, extractive institutions em­
phasized and illustrated in Chapter 4. The reader should note that many different terms could 
have been used instead of “authoritarian” and “participatory,” and some details of the dis­
tinction may be arbitrary. More importantly, it should be borne in mind that even the most 
participatory regime involves an unequal distribution of political power, and those who have 
more political power can use the ﬁscal and political instruments of the state for their own 
beneﬁts and for the detriment of the society at large. Why this type of behavior is sometimes 
successfully curtailed or limited is a question at the forefront of current research, and I do not 
dwell on it here. 
Why Did the World Not Experience Sustained Growth before 1800? 
While sustained growth is a recent phenomenon, growth and improvements in living standards 
certainly have occurred many times in the past. Human history is also full of major techno­
logical breakthroughs. Even before the Neolithic Revolution, many technological innovations 
increased the productivity of hunter-gatherers. The transition to farming after about 9000 b.c. 
is perhaps the most signiﬁcant technological revolution of all times: it led to increased agri­
cultural productivity and the development of socially and politically more complex societies. 
Archaeologists have also documented various instances of economic growth in premodern 
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ancient Greek society from 800 b.c. to 50 b.c. (Morris, 2004). Similar improvements in living 
standards were experienced by the Roman republic and empire after 400 b.c. (Hopkins, 1980) 
and also appear to have been experienced by pre-Columbian civilizations in South America, es­
pecially by the Olmec, the Maya, the Aztec, and even perhaps the Inca (Webster, 2002; Mann, 
2004). Although data on these ancient growth experiences are limited, the available evidence 
suggests that the basic neoclassical model, in which growth relies mostly on physical capital 
accumulation, provides a good description of the developments in these ancient economies 
(see, e.g., Morris, 2004). 
However, these growth experiences were qualitatively different from those that the world 
experienced after its economic takeoff starting in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. Four factors appear to have been particularly important and set these growth episodes 
apart from modern economic growth. First, earlier episodes were relatively short-lived or took 
place at a relatively slow pace.1 In most cases, the initial spurt of growth soon crumbled for 
one reason or another, somehow reminiscent of the failed takeoffs in the model of Section 17.6 
in Chapter 17. Secondly and relatedly, growth was never based on continuous technological 
innovations; thus it never resembled the technology-based growth described in Chapters 13–15. 
Third, in most cases economic institutions that would be necessary to support sustained growth 
did not develop. Financial relations were generally primitive, contracting institutions remained 
informal, markets were heavily regulated with various internal tariffs, and incomes and savings 
did not reach the levels necessary for the mass market and simultaneous investments in a range 
of activities to become proﬁtable. Put differently, the structural transformations accompanying 
development discussed in Chapter 21 did not take place. Fourth (and arguably most important 
and the cause of the ﬁrst three), all these episodes took place within the context of authoritarian 
political regimes. They were not broad-based growth experiences. Instead, this was elite-driven 
growth for the beneﬁt of the elite that largely exploited existing comparative advantages. Thus 
it is not surprising that the improvements in living standards did not affect the entire society 
but only a minority. 
Why did these growth episodes not turn into a process of takeoff, ultimately leading to 
sustained growth? My main answer is related to that offered in Section 23.3 in Chapter 23. 
Growth under authoritarian regimes is possible. Entrepreneurs and workers can become better 
at what they do, achieve a better division of labor, and improve the technologies they work 
with by tinkering and learning by doing. Moreover,  those with political power and their 
allies do have the necessary security of property rights to undertake investments. And some 
technological breakthroughs can happen by chance. Nevertheless a distinguishing feature of 
growth under authoritarian institutions is that it protects the interests of the current elite. 
So in the ﬁnal analysis,  growth must always rely on existing techniques and production 
relationships. It will not unleash the process of creative destruction and the entry of new 
talent and new businesses necessary to carry a nation to the state of sustained growth. In 
addition, technological constraints may have also played a role. For example, the relatively 
rapid growth in the nineteenth century required skilled workers, and before the printing press 
was invented, it would have been prohibitively costly for a critical mass of workers to acquire 
the necessary skills. Although the progress of technological knowledge is not monotonic (and 
useful production techniques are sometimes forgotten), the technological know-how available 
to potential entrepreneurs at the end of the eighteenth century was undoubtedly greater than 
that available to potential entrepreneurs in Rome or ancient Greece. 
1. For example, in ancient Greece, Morris (2004) estimates that income per capita doubled or at most tripled 
in the 500 years between 800 b.c. and 300 b.c., and this was largely caused by catch-up growth starting from 
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Let me next elaborate on the aspects of political economy that appear to be critical and pro­
vide a few examples to illustrate the limits to growth under authoritarian regimes. The available 
evidence shows that the Chinese empire was technologically innovative during many distinct 
phases of its history. Productivity in the Chinese economy, especially in the Yangtze Delta and 
other fertile lands, was high enough to support a high density of population. But the Chinese 
economy never came close to sustained growth. Authoritarian political institutions have regu­
lated economic activity tightly for most of Chinese history. The society was hierarchical, with 
a clear distinction between the elite and the masses. This system did not allow free entry into 
business by new entrepreneurs who would adopt and exploit new technologies and unleash the 
powers of creative destruction. When prospects for economic growth conﬂicted with political 
stability, the elite opted for maintaining stability, even if this came at the expense of potential 
economic growth. Thus China tightly controlled overseas and internal trade, did not develop 
the broad-based property rights and contracting institutions necessary for modern economic 
growth, and did not allow an autonomous middle class to emerge as an economic and political 
force (Elvin, 1973; Mokyr, 1990; Wong, 1997). 
The ancient Greek and Roman civilizations are often viewed as the ﬁrst democratic societies. 
One might therefore be tempted to count them as participatory regimes that should have 
achieved sustained economic growth. But this is not necessarily the case. First, as noted above, 
participatory regimes do not guarantee sustained economic growth when other preconditions 
have not been met. But more importantly, these societies were democratic only in comparison to 
others at the time. Both societies were representative only for a small fraction of the population. 
Production relied on slavery and coercion. Moreover, despite certain democratic practices, 
there was a clear distinction between a small elite, which monopolized economic and political 
power, and the masses, which consisted of both free plebs and slaves. Economic growth in 
both ancient Greece and Rome did not rely on continuous innovation. Both societies managed 
to achieve high levels of productivity in agriculture but without changing the organization of 
production in a radical manner. Both societies beneﬁted from their military superiority for a 
while, and challenges to their military power were also important factors in their decline. 
The Ottoman Empire provides another example of a society that was successful for an 
extended period of time but without ever transitioning to sustained growth. The Ottoman 
Empire, especially during the fourteenth, ﬁfteenth, and sixteenth centuries, achieved relative 
prosperity and military strength. Agricultural productivity was high in many parts of the empire, 
and military tribute contributed to state coffers and generated revenues to be distributed to 
parts of the population. But the state elite, who controlled decision making within the empire, 
never encouraged broad-based economic growth. There was no private property in land, trade 
was permitted as long as it was consistent with the state’s objectives but was always tightly 
controlled, and any new technology that could destabilize the power of the state was blocked. 
Like China, Greece, and Rome, the Ottoman growth ﬁrst tapered off and then turned into 
decline (Pamuk, 2004). 
The ﬁnal example I mention is the Spanish monarchy. By the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, the Spanish crown had achieved both political dominance over its own lands under 
Ferdinand and Isabella and control of a large overseas empire through its colonial enterprises. 
Many parts of greater Spain, including the lands of Aragon and the south that had been recently 
reconquered from the Moors, were already prosperous in the ﬁfteenth century. The whole of 
Spain became much wealthier with the transfer of gold, silver, and other resources from the 
colonies in the sixteenth century. But this wealth did not translate into sustained growth. The 
colonial experiment was managed under a highly authoritarian regime set up by Ferdinand 
and Isabella, and the most lucrative businesses were allocated to the allies of the crown. The 
greater revenues generated from the colonies only helped to tighten the grip of the crown on 
the rest of the society and the economy. Instead of abating, absolutism increased. Trade and . 868  Epilogue: Mechanics and Causes of Economic Growth 
industry remained highly regulated, and groups not directly allied to the crown were viewed 
suspiciously and discriminated against. The most extreme example of this, the persecution of 
Jews that had started under the Inquisition, continued and spilled over to other independent 
merchants. Subsequent to the transfer of wealth from the colonies, Spain experienced a very 
lengthy period of stagnation, with economic and political decline (Elliott, 1963). 
It is also remarkable that in none of these cases did complementary economic institutions 
develop. Financial institutions remained rudimentary. The Roman Republic developed a pre­
cursor to the modern corporation and allowed some contracts between free citizens, but by 
and large economic prosperity was built on traditional economic activities that did not neces­
sitate complex relationships among producers and between ﬁrms and workers. Consequently 
the structural transformations that accompany economic growth never took place in these so­
cieties. Life was largely rural, and social relations were dominated by the state and community 
enforcement. Perhaps more important, there was little investment in human capital, except for 
the elite for whom education was seldom a means to higher productivity. Without broad-based 
human capital and political rights, creative destruction becomes even more difﬁcult as a large 
fraction of the population is barred from entrepreneurial activities. All of the cases discussed 
here conﬁrm this expectation. 
Overall, these cases illustrate that societies that encourage increases in the productivity of 
the elite in traditional activities can secure growth for a while. But they are unlikely to engender 
creative destruction. Growth goes hand-in-hand with the political domination of the elite and 
thus with entry barriers protecting the status and the power of the elite. In this light, the answer 
to the question of “why not before 1800” is twofold. First, no society before 1800 invested 
in human capital, allowed new ﬁrms to bring new technology, and generally unleashed the 
powers of creative destruction. This failure might have been partly due to the difﬁculty of 
undertaking broad-based human capital investments in societies without the printing press and 
with only limited communication technologies. But it was also related to the reward structures 
for and constraints on workers and ﬁrms. An important consequence of this pattern of growth 
is that no society experienced the sweeping structural transformations that are an essential 
part of modern economic growth (Chapter 21). Second, no society took steps toward sustained 
growth, because all these societies lived under authoritarian political regimes. 
Why Did Economic Takeoff Start around 1800 and in Western Europe? 
The division of labor (emphasized by Adam Smith) and capital accumulation always present 
growth opportunities to societies. Furthermore human ingenuity is strong enough to create 
room for major technological breakthroughs in almost any environment. Thus there is always 
a growth impetus in human societies (Jones, 1988). Nevertheless this impetus may only be 
latent because it exists in the context of a set of political (and economic) institutions. When 
these institutions do not encourage growth—when they do not provide the right kind of reward 
structure and so punish rather than reward innovations—we do not expect the growth impetus to 
lead to sustained growth. Even in such environments, economic growth is possible, and this is 
why China, Greece, Rome, and other empires experienced growth for part of their history. But 
this prosperity did not exploit the full growth impetus; instead, it took place in the context of 
political regimes that, by their nature, had to control the growth impetus, because this impetus 
would ultimately bring these regimes down. 
West European growth starting in the late eighteenth century was different, because Western 
Europe underwent three important structural transformations starting in the late Middle Ages. 
These structural transformations created an environment in which the latent growth impetus 
could turn into an engine of sustained growth. . A Possible Perspective on Growth and Stagnation over the Past 200 Years  869 
The ﬁrst was the collapse of one of the pillars of the ancient regime,  the decline of 
feudal relations in Western Europe. Starting in the thirteenth century and especially after the 
Black Death during the mid-fourteenth century, feudal economic relations crumbled in many 
parts of Western Europe. Serfs were freed from their feudal dues either by default (because 
the relationship collapsed) or by ﬂeeing to the expanding city centers (Postan, 1966). This 
emancipation heralded the beginning of an important social transformation: urbanization and 
changes in social relations. But perhaps more importantly, it created a labor force ready to 
work at cheap wages in industrial and commercial activities. It also removed one of the greatest 
sources of conﬂict between existing elites and new entrepreneurs—competition in the labor 
market (Chapter 22). The decline of the feudal order further weakened the power base of the 
European authoritarian regimes (Pirenne, 1937). 
The second structural transformation was related. With the decline in population in the four­
teenth century, real incomes increased in much of Europe, and many cities created sufﬁciently 
large markets for merchants to seek new imports and for industrialists to seek new products. 
During the Middle Ages, a range of important technologies in metallurgy, armaments, agricul­
ture, and basic industry (e.g., textiles), were already perfected (White, 1964; Mokyr, 1990). 
Thus the European economy had reached the technological maturity to act as a platform for 
entrepreneurial activity in a range of areas, and income levels were sufﬁcient to encourage 
investment in physical capital and technology to spearhead new production relations. 
The third and most important change was political. The late Middle Ages also witnessed the 
start of a political process that inexorably led to the collapse of absolutist monarchies and to the 
rise of constitutional regimes. The constitutional regimes that emerged in the sixteenth and sev­
enteenth centuries in Western Europe were the ﬁrst examples of participatory regimes, because 
they shifted political power to a large group of individuals that were previously outsiders to po­
litical power. This group included the gentry, small merchants, proto-industrialists, as well as 
overseas traders and ﬁnanciers. These regimes then provided secure property rights and growth-
enhancing institutions for a broad cross section of society. These institutional changes created 
the requisite environment for new investments and technological changes and the beginning 
of sustained growth, which would culminate in the Commercial Revolution in the Netherlands 
and Britain during the seventeenth century and in the British Industrial Revolution at the end of 
the eighteenth century. By the nineteenth century, industry and commerce had spread to much 
of Western Europe (see Chapter 4; North and Thomas, 1973). 
It is noteworthy that constitutional monarchies were not democracies as we understand them 
today. There was no one-person one-vote principle, and the distinction between the rich and 
the poor was quite palpable. Nevertheless these regimes emerged as responses to the demands 
by the merchants and industrialists. More importantly, these constitutional regimes not only 
reformed the political institutions of Western Europe but undertook a series of economic 
reforms facilitating modern capitalist growth. Internal tariffs and regulations were lifted. Entry 
into domestic businesses and foreign trade was greatly facilitated. For example, the process of 
ﬁnancial development in Britain began with the founding of the Bank of England and other 
ﬁnancial reforms. 
These constitutional regimes, which emerged ﬁrst in Britain and the Netherlands and then in 
France and other parts of Western Europe, paved the way for sustained economic growth based 
on property rights for a broad cross section of society, contract enforcement, the rule of law, 
and free entry into existing and new business lines. According to the theoretical perspective 
developed in earlier chapters, these improved conditions should have led to greater investments 
in physical capital, human capital, and technology. This is indeed what happened, and the 
process of modern economic growth was launched. Economic relations now relied on new 
businesses investing in industry, commerce, and the formation of complex organizational 
forms and production relations. Growth did not immediately accelerate. Economic growth . 870  Epilogue: Mechanics and Causes of Economic Growth 
was present but modest during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Maddison, 2001). But 
these institutional changes laid the foundations for the more rapid growth that was soon to come. 
Financial institutions developed, the urban areas expanded further, new technologies were 
invented, and markets became the primary arena for transactions and competition (North and 
Thomas, 1973). By 1800, the process of technological change and investment had progressed so 
much as to be dubbed the “Industrial Revolution” (Ashton, 1969; Mokyr, 1993). The ﬁrst phase 
of the Industrial Revolution was followed by the production of yet newer technologies, more 
complex organizations, greater reliance on skills and human capital in the production process, 
and increasing globalization of the world economy. By the second half of the nineteenth 
century, Western Europe had reached unprecedented growth levels. 
Naturally, a complete answer to the question in the title of this subsection requires an 
explanation for why the constitutional regimes that were so important for modern economic 
growth emerged in Western Europe starting in the late sixteenth century and seventeenth 
century. These institutions had their roots in the late medieval aristocratic parliaments in 
Europe, but more importantly, they were the outcome of radical reform resulting from the 
change in the political balance of power in Europe starting in the sixteenth century (Ertman, 
1997). The sixteenth century witnessed a major economic transformation of Europe, following 
the increase in international trade due to the discovery of the New World and the rounding of 
the Cape of Good Hope (Davis, 1973; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005a). Together 
with increased overseas trade came greater commercial activity within Europe. These changes 
led to a modest increase in living standards, and more importantly, to greater economic and 
political power for a new group of merchants, traders, and industrialists. These new men were 
not the traditional allies of the European monarchies. They therefore demanded, and often were 
powerful enough to obtain, changes in political institutions that provided them with greater 
security of property rights and government action to help them in their economic endeavors. 
By this time, with the collapse of the feudal order, the foundations of the authoritarian regimes 
that were in place in the Middle Ages were already weak. Nevertheless the changes leading to 
the constitutional regimes did not come easy. The Dutch had to ﬁght the Hapsburg monarchy 
to gain their independence as a republic. Britain had to endure its civil war and the Glorious 
Revolution. France had to go through the Revolution of 1789. But in all cases, the ancien 
regime gave way to more representative institutions, with greater checks on absolute power 
and greater participation by merchants, industrialists, and entrepreneurs. It was important that 
the social changes led to a new set of political institutions and not simply to concessions. This 
distinction is related to the theoretical ideas emphasized in Section 23.3 of Chapter 23: the 
nascent groups demanded long-term guarantees for the protection of their property rights and 
their participation in economic life. Such guarantees were most easily delivered by changes in 
political institutions, not by short-term concessions. 
These changes created the set of political institutions that would then enable the emergence 
of the economic institutions mentioned above. The collapse of the authoritarian political 
regimes and the rise of the ﬁrst participatory regimes then opened the way for modern economic 
growth. 
Why Did Some Societies Manage to Beneﬁt
 
from New Technologies While Others Failed to Do So?
 
The economic takeoff started in Western Europe but quickly spread to certain other parts of 
the world. The chief importer of economic institutions and economic growth was the United 
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crown to gain their independence and set up a smallholder society, already had participatory 
political institutions. This was a society built by the people who would live in it, and they 
were particularly willing to create checks and balances to prevent the subsequent emergence 
of a strong political or economic elite. This environment turned out to be a perfect conduit 
for modern economic growth. The lack of a strong political and economic elite meant that a 
broad cross section of society could take part in economic activity, import technologies from 
Western Europe, and then build their own technologies to quickly become the major industrial 
power in the world (Galenson, 1996; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Keyssar, 2000; Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, 2002). In the context of this example, the importance of technology 
adoption from the world technology frontier is in line with the emphasis in Chapter 18, while 
the growth-promoting effects of a lack of elite creating entry barriers is consistent with the 
approach in Section 23.3 in Chapter 23. 
Similar processes took place in other West European offshoots, for example, in Canada. 
Yet in other parts of the world, adoption of new technologies and the process of economic 
growth came as part of a movement toward defensive modernization. Japan started its economic 
and political modernization with the Meiji restoration (or perhaps even before), and a central 
element of this modernization effort was the importation of new technologies. 
However these attitudes to new technologies were by no means universal. New technologies 
were not adopted, but resisted, in many parts of the world. This included most of Eastern 
Europe—for example, Russia and Austria-Hungary—where the existing land-based elites saw 
new technologies as a threat both to their economic interests (because they would lead to the 
end of the feudal relations that still continued in this part of Europe) and to their political 
interests, which relied on limiting the power of new merchants and slowing down the process 
of peasants migrating to cities to become the new working class (see Freudenberger, 1967, 
and Mosse, 1992, for evidence, and Chapter 22 for a theoretical perspective). Similarly, the 
previously prosperous plantation economies in the Caribbean had no interest in introducing new 
technologies and allowing free entry by entrepreneurs. These societies continued to rely on their 
agricultural staples. Industrialization, competition in free labor markets, and workers investing 
in their human capital were seen as potential threats to the economic and political powers of the 
elite. The newly independent nations in Latin America were also dominated by a political elite, 
which continued the tradition of the colonial elite and showed little interest in industrialization. 
Much of Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and almost all of sub-Saharan Africa were 
still West European colonies and were governed under authoritarian and repressive regimes 
(often as producers of raw materials for the rapidly industrializing Western European nations 
or as sources of tribute). Free labor markets, factor mobility, creative destruction, and new 
technologies did not feature in the colonial political trajectories of these countries (Chapter 4). 
Thus the nineteenth century was only to see the industrialization of a few select places. By 
the twentieth century, however, more and more nations started importing the technologies that 
had been developed and used in Western Europe. This process of technology transfer pulled 
the countries integrated into in the global economy toward higher income levels (Chapter 19). 
But this growth episode did not beneﬁt all countries. Many had to wait for their independence 
from their colonial masters, and even then, the end of colonialism led to a period of instability 
and inﬁghting among would-be elites. Once some degree of political stability was achieved 
and economic institutions that encourage growth were put in place, growth started. For ex­
ample, growth in Australia and New Zealand was followed by that in Hong Kong, by that in 
South Korea, then by the rest of Southeast Asia, and ﬁnally by India. In each of these cases, as 
emphasized in Chapters 20 and 21, growth went hand-in-hand with structural transformations. 
Once the structural transformations were under way, they facilitated further growth. Consistent 
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importing technologies and achieved growth rates in line with the growth of the world technol­
ogy frontier (and often exceeding those during their initial phase of catch-up). In most cases, 
this process meant growth for the new members of the global economy but not necessarily the 
disappearance of the income gap between these new members and the earlier industrializers. 
Meanwhile many parts of the world continued to suffer political instability that discouraged 
investment in capital and new technology or even exhibited overt hostility to new technologies. 
These included parts of sub-Saharan Africa and, until recently, much of Central America. 
Returning to some of the examples discussed in Chapter 1, Nigeria and Guatemala failed to 
create incentives for their entrepreneurs or workers both during their colonial periods and 
after independence. Both these countries also experienced signiﬁcant political instability and 
economically disastrous civil wars in the postwar era. Brazil managed to achieve some degree 
of growth, but it was mostly based on investment by large, heavily protected corporations and 
not on a sustained process of technological change and creative destruction (thus it was more 
similar to the oligarchic growth in terms of the model of Section 23.3 in Chapter 23). In these 
and other cases, policies that failed to provide secure property rights to new entrepreneurs 
and those that blocked the adoption of new technologies—as well as political instability and 
inﬁghting among the elites—seem to have played an important role in the failure to join the 
world economy and its growth process. Overall, these areas fell behind the world average in the 
nineteenth century and continued to trail for most of the twentieth century. Many nations in sub-
Saharan Africa, such as Congo, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, are still experiencing political turmoil 
and fail to offer even the most basic rights to their entrepreneurs and citizens. Consequently 
many are falling still further behind the world average. 
Many Remaining Questions 
The previous section provided a narrative emphasizing how technological changes transformed 
the world economy starting in the eighteenth century and how certain societies took advantage 
of these changes while others failed to do so. Parts of the story receive support from the data. The 
importance of industrialization to the initial takeoff is now well documented. There is a broad 
consensus that economic institutions protecting property rights and allowing for free entry and 
introduction of new technologies were important in the nineteenth century and continue to be 
important today in securing economic growth. There is also a general consensus that political 
instability, weak property rights, and lack of infrastructure are major impediments to growth 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless the narrative here is speculative. These factors might be 
important, but they may not be the main explaination of the evolution of the world income 
distribution over the past 200 years. And as yet there is no consensus on the role of political 
institutions in this process. 
Thus what I have presented here should be taken for what it is: a speculative answer that 
needs to be further investigated. My purpose in outlining it was not only that I suspect this 
answer has much truth to it but also to show how the various models developed in this book can 
help us better frame answers to fundamental questions of economic growth (and of economics 
and social sciences in general). I should add that further investigation of the causes of the 
world’s takeoff into sustained growth and the failure of some nations to take advantage of this 
process is only one of the many remaining challenges. The political economy of growth is 
important because it enables us to ask and answer questions about the fundamental causes of 
economic growth. But many other aspects of the process of growth require further study. In 
some sense, the ﬁeld of economic growth is one of the more mature areas in economics, and 
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of models are useful for the study of economic dynamics and for empirical analysis. And yet 
there is so much that we still do not know. 
I now end by mentioning a few areas with great potential for further theoretical and 
empirical advances. First,  although here I have largely focused on factors facilitating or 
preventing the adoption of technologies in less-developed nations, there is still much to be 
done to understand the pace of technological progress in frontier economies. Our models of 
endogenous technological change give us the basic framework for thinking about how proﬁt 
incentives shape investments in new technologies. But we still know relatively little about the 
industrial organization of innovation, for example, on how market structure affects economic 
growth. Chapters 12 and 14 highlighted how different market structures may create different 
incentives for technological change. But most of our understanding of these issues is qualitative. 
For example, in the context of the economics of innovation, we lack a framework—similar to 
that used for the analysis of the effects of capital and labor income taxes and indirect taxes in 
public ﬁnance—which could be used to analyze the effects of various regulations, IPR policies, 
and anticompetitive laws on innovation and economic growth. Since the pace at which the world 
technology frontier progresses has a direct effect on the growth of many nations, even small 
improvements in the environment for innovation in advanced economies could have important 
dividends for the rest of the world. 
In addition to the industrial organization of innovation, the contractual structure of inno­
vation needs further study. We live in a complex society in which most ﬁrms are linked to 
others as suppliers or downstream customers, and most ﬁrms are connected to the rest of the 
economy indirectly through their relationship with ﬁnancial markets. These relationships are 
mediated by various explicit and implicit contracts. Similarly, the employment relationship 
that underlies the productivity of most ﬁrms relies on contractual relations between employers 
and employees. We know that moral hazard and holdup problems occur in these contractual 
relationships. But how important are they for the process of economic growth? Can improve­
ments in contracting institutions improve innovation and technological upgrading in frontier 
economies? Can they also facilitate technology transfer? These are basic, but as yet, un­
answered questions. The contractual foundations of economic growth are still in their infancy 
and require much work. 
The previous section emphasized how several economies started the growth process by 
importing technologies and thus integrating into the global economy. Today we live in an 
increasingly globalized and globalizing economy. But there is still much to understand about 
how technology is transferred from some ﬁrms to others and from advanced economies to less-
developed ones. The models I presented in Chapter 19 emphasized the importance of human 
capital, barriers to technology adoption, issues of appropriate technology, and contracting 
problems. Nevertheless most of the models are still at the qualitative level, and we lack a 
framework that can make quantitative predictions about the pace of technology diffusion. We 
have also not yet incorporated many important notions related to technology transfer into our 
basic frameworks. These include, among others, ideas related to tacit knowledge, appropriate 
technology, the workings of the international division of labor, the role of international IPR 
protection, and the interaction between trade and technology diffusion. 
The reader will have also noticed that the material presented in Chapter 21 is much less 
uniﬁed and perhaps more speculative than that in the rest of the book. Although some of this 
reﬂects the fact that I had to simplify a variety of models to be able to present them in a limited 
space, much of it is because we are far from a satisfactory framework for understanding the 
process of economic development and the structural transformations that it involves. Some 
aspects of these structural transformations, such as the increased importance of manufacturing 
and then services relative to agriculture, can be viewed as a by-product of economic growth. But 
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regimes, urbanization, and the amount and composition of human capital investments, may be 
facilitators or even preconditions for economic growth and development. Thus the lack of 
signiﬁcant structural transformation might be an important factor in delaying or preventing 
economic growth. To understand these questions, we require models with stronger theoretical 
foundations, a systematic approach to these related issues, and a greater effort to link the 
models of economic development to the wealth of empirical evidence that the profession has 
now accumulated on economic behavior in less-developed economies. 
Last but not least, given the narrative in the last section and the discussion in Chapters 4, 22, 
and 23, it comes as no surprise that I think many important insights about economic growth lie 
in political economy. But understanding politics is in many ways harder than understanding 
economics, because political relations are even more multifaceted. Although I believe that the 
political economy and growth literatures have made important advances in this area over the 
past decade or so, much remains to be done. The political economy of growth is in its infancy, 
and as we further investigate why societies make different collective choices, we will gain a 
better understanding of the process of economic growth. 